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A Great and Profitable Clause: Why the New York City Bar
Association Says It Is Time To Pay Attention to Investors Behind the
Curtain*
Litigation finance has rapidly evolved into a contemporary form that has become
a multi-billion-dollar business in the United States. The rise of commercial
litigation funding has led to the creation of finance firms with the specific intent
to generate extreme profits from the American legal system. As the practice
continues to experience exponential growth, it is increasingly important to ensure
there are sufficient controls over the industry. Though there is currently little to
no regulatory oversight, the American Bar Association’s Model Code of
Responsibility suggests that the rule prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and
nonlawyers should limit litigation finance arrangements that utilize contingent
funding agreements. This Comment explores that suggestion and seeks to
introduce other regulatory considerations through an analysis of an advisory
opinion issued by the New York City Bar Association.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, one hundred years of ethical standards have shaped
fee sharing arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers.1 Under the
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the general
standard demands that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with . . .
[nonlawyers].”2 In other words, lawyers are prohibited from splitting client fees
with anyone who is not a lawyer, such as a lender or financier.3 Presently, all
fifty states have adopted similar provisions.4 The purpose of this rule is to
ensure that lawyers are not tempted to act under the guise of client interest
when their motivations have actually been improperly influenced by fee sharing
arrangements.5 Thus, the question becomes: What constitutes the undue
influence that can ultimately create an impermissible fee sharing arrangement?
Over the last decade, commercial litigation funding6 has expanded to the
United States after its overseas growth in Australia and the United Kingdom.7
As this contemporary investment practice has continued to rapidly expand, so
too have the concerns about the potential for a new age of undue influence
controlling modern fee sharing arrangements. The New York City Bar
1. See generally ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908) (requiring lawyers to
represent their clients with “undivided fidelity,” including limiting their ability to enter into
subsequent arrangements).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1980).
3. Throughout this Comment, “financiers” is used to refer to the third-party individuals who
provide capital contributions to fund litigation.
4. All fifty states have a Rule of Professional Conduct specifying a degree of professional
independence for lawyers. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019); N.C. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019); WIS. SUP.
CT. R. 20:5.4(a).
5. See generally N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 3 (2018) (“The
purpose of the rule against fee sharing is to remove any incentive for nonlawyers to engage in
undesirable behavior such as (1) interfering with a lawyer’s professional judgment in handling of a legal
matter, (2) using dishonest or illegal methods . . . in order to win cases . . . or (3) encouraging or
pressuring a lawyer to use such improper methods.” (quoting ROY D. SIMON & NICOLE HYLAND,
SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 1420 (2017))).
6. Generally, commercial litigation funding arrangements involve investment commitments
ranging from $500,000 to upwards of $20 million with the expectation of payouts exceeding $25
million. STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES:
ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 16 (2010).
7. See Damian Grave & Helen Mould, Litigation Funding on the Rise, HERBERT SMITH
FREEHILLS (May 23, 2018), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/litigationfunding-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/D25E-7Z24].
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Association (“NYCBA”) recently issued an advisory opinion that called for an
examination of these influences and suggested expanding the definition of
impermissible arrangements. The NYCBA stated that fee sharing is not
permissible when the “lawyer’s future payments to the [litigation] funder are
contingent on the lawyer’s receipt of legal fees or on the amount of legal fees
received in one or more specific matters.”8 Although merely an advisory
opinion, the NYCBA’s recent interpretation of its version of Rule 5.4(a)9
spotlights a growing, potential ethical issue in today’s legal system.10
This Comment describes the rise in litigation finance and analyzes how
one bar association—the New York City Bar Association—has characterized
this modern investment structure as an impermissible fee sharing arrangement
due to the inherent ability of investors to influence litigation and the present
lack of sufficient regulatory structures.11
Analysis will proceed in four parts. Part I details the rise of litigation
finance in the American legal system and the emergence of commercial
litigation-finance firms. Part II examines the historical development of the
professional responsibility standard for impermissible fee sharing. Part III
describes why modern litigation financing should be considered an
impermissible nonrecourse loan12 subject to fee sharing restrictions due to the
inherent influence modern-day funders retain over the cases they finance and
the lack of regulation of the industry. Finally, Part IV evaluates funders’
criticism of this interpretation and argues that such criticism overlooks the idea
that investment analysts at these contemporary finance firms are former lawyers
whose previous knowledge and experience provide the potential to manipulate
litigation in the American legal system.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
In its most basic sense, litigation finance, or litigation funding, is a loan in
which a third party provides financing in exchange for a share of any recovery
earned from an underlying lawsuit.13 Litigation finance is not a new

8. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 1 (2018).
9. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019) (“Professional Independence of a
Lawyer”).
10. Unless otherwise specified, this Comment primarily focuses on the New York City Bar
Association’s analysis of the State of New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct.
11. See infra Part III.
12. Non-Recourse Loan, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/nonrecourse-loan.html [https://perma.cc/2VPD-LX5F] (defining “non-recourse loan” as a loan secured
only by the collateral lent to the borrower which prevents the lender from holding the borrower
personally liable upon default).
13. See John Freund, Everything You Ever Wanted To Know About Litigation Finance, LITIG. FIN.
J. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://litigationfinancejournal.com/litfin101/everything-ever-wanted-knowlitigation-finance/ [https://perma.cc/9XUY-UEBW].
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phenomenon and is not inherently bad. In fact, the NYCBA specifically
acknowledged that a traditional recourse loan14 is a completely valid form of a
financing arrangement between a lawyer and nonlawyer.15 Issues arise when
financing arrangements are structured with contingent repayment obligations
based on the outcome of the underlying litigation. Thus, the purpose and
structure of a loan determines whether a fee sharing arrangement is permissible.
The evolution of litigation financing provides greater insight into the
distinction between permissible and impermissible arrangements.
A.

The Beginning and Early Evolution

The earliest recorded instance of litigation financing occurred during the
sixth century B.C.E. in Athens, where third-party financiers intervened to help
injured parties that could not effectively represent themselves against more
powerful entities.16 Originally, the process was motivated by altruistic
intentions to further the public welfare, but over time, abusive practices by
private individuals corrupted this original intent.17 As legal financing began to
spread to other civilizations, the practice expanded in scope. The rise of
“calumniators”18 in Ancient Rome created disinterested litigation financiers
analogous to modern-day third-party funders.19 In the Middle Ages, however,
rule makers questioned the underlying iniquities of litigation finance and
intervened.
In medieval England, feudal lords began taking advantage of their ability
to finance lawsuits. These lords would use their financial resources to sponsor
lawsuits against their enemies with the hope of receiving an opportunity to gain
joint ownership over land in dispute.20 If financiers were successful, they
essentially achieved two victories. First, they obtained power through the
acquisition of additional land interests; second, they stripped power from their
adversaries. Because of this unfairness, the common law doctrines of barratry,
maintenance, and champerty were formed, and these activities were deemed
illegal.21 To understand these rules, a brief summary of important terminology
used will help explain how these rules have changed over time. “Barratry is the
14. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 2 (“[A] traditional recourse
loan requir[es] the lawyer to repay the loan at a fixed rate of interest without regard to the outcome of
. . . any particular lawsuit or lawsuits.”).
15. See id.
16. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 49 (1935).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 53 (defining “calumniator” as a person who brings an “unnecessary or baseless
action[]” or a person “who without authorization bring[s an] action[]. . . with which they have no
concern”).
19. See id. at 52 (describing the Romans’ takeover of third-party litigation financing).
20. See id. at 60.
21. See id. at 64–67.
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vexatious incitement to litigation, especially by soliciting potential legal
clients.”22 “[M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit” and “champerty
is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome.”23 These
doctrines became the basis for the present-day fee sharing rules.24
Today, third-party funding of lawsuits has evolved into four distinct
forms: (1) the client-funder arrangement, (2) the lawyer-funder fixed recourse
loan, (3) the contingent fixed loan, and (4) the contingent sliding-scale loan. In
its advisory opinion, the NYCBA found two of these forms—now commonplace
in the modern legal scheme—to be permissible financing arrangements.25 First,
the client-funder arrangement involves a structure where the funder contracts
directly with the client, and the client agrees to pay the funder a percentage or
set amount if the client wins his or her case.26 This approach is permissible
because the lawyer and nonlawyer share no actual fees; the “Professional
Independence of a Lawyer” rule is not implicated because the lawyer is not a
party to the arrangement.27 The second common arrangement is the traditional
recourse loan, which has also been established as a permissible form of fee
sharing.28
In contrast, the two fee sharing arrangements with repayment obligations
contingent on a lawyer winning a case have been condemned as impermissible.
The first—contingent fixed loan—sets a percentage or fixed fee “that the lawyer
will pay . . . only if the lawyer receives legal fees in the matter.”29 The second—
contingent sliding-scale loan—is also dependent on the lawyer winning the case,
but the amount to be paid is determined after the fact based on an undetermined
amount.30 While litigation funding appears in multiple varieties, the underlying
structure is usually based, to some degree, on one of these four methods.

22. Barratry, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
23. See Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation,
58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 579 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 424–25 n.15 (1978)).
24. See Robert Barton & Wendy Walker, Alternative Litigation Finance, Part 2, 29 PROB. & PROP.
50, 50–51 (2015).
25. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 2 (2018).
26. See id. at 1–2.
27. See id. at 2.
28. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (determining that the traditional recourse loan
is the most commonly used permissible method of fee sharing today).
29. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 2.
30. See id.
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Recent History

Under the newest form of third-party litigation funding, financiers have
expanded the practice to unprecedented levels.31 Today, funders use portfolio
investments32 to mitigate risk and generate multi-million-dollar gains.33
Financiers “back[] plaintiffs with individual cases as well as portfolios of cases
being pursued by a single law firm.”34 While the practice began abroad,35 it has
slowly become part of contemporary litigation practice in the United States.
1. Development in Australia
Investment procedure in Australia has shaped the most recent form of
litigation finance in the United States. In the mid-1990s, Australia passed
legislation allowing “practitioners to enter into contracts to finance litigation
characterized as company property,” setting the stage for the present-day
financing of litigation.36 The legislation led to the creation of the first litigationfinance firms, which originated with the specific intent of seeking out profitable
lawsuits.37 Initially, the growth of litigation finance was relatively slow because
funders were concerned about the parameters of the insolvency legislation and
the ethical boundaries of litigation finance.38 In 2006, these concerns were cast
aside when the “Australian High Court held that third-party litigation funding
arrangements served a legitimate purpose in lawsuits and were not an abuse of
process or contrary to public policy.”39 After the High Court legitimized these
arrangements, the growth of litigation finance exploded.40 In 2015, third-party
funding in Australia accounted for over $3 billion of the $21.1 billion litigation

31. See Lake Whillans, The History and Evolution of Litigation Finance, ABOVE L. (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/01/the-history-and-evolution-of-litigation-finance/?rf=1
[https://perma.cc/3JVR-52UV].
32. “A portfolio investment is a hands-off or passive investment of securities in a portfolio, and
it is made with the expectation of earning a return.” James Chen, Portfolio Investment, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/portfolio-investment.asp [https://perma.cc/XC3T-SMS9].
33. Sara Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job: Litigation Finance, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-hot-law-job-litigation-finance-1530783000
[https://perma.cc/EF7Y-AND2 (dark archive)] [hereinafter Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job]
(reporting that a $12.8 million investment resulted in a $107 million payout).
34. See id.
35. See Whillans, supra note 31.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. The case was Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd. [2006] 80 ALJR 1441,
1462 (Austl.) (“The Abolition Act abolished the crimes, and the torts, of maintenance and champerty.
By abolishing those crimes, and those torts, any wider rule of public policy . . . lost whatever narrow
and insecure footing remained for such a rule.”).
40. See id. (“Today, nearly all major class actions in Australia are funded by private litigation
finance companies.”).

98 N.C. L. REV. 973 (2020)

2020]

A GREAT & PROFITABLE CLAUSE

979

market.41 Australia’s insurgence of this new-age funding was a significant
contributing factor to the creation of litigation finance in the United States.
2. Development in the United Kingdom (UK)
The UK’s implementation of funding arrangements was another key
reason for the rise of third-party funding in the United States. Two specific
events opened the door for litigation finance in the UK. First, the UK’s
Criminal Law Act of 1967 decriminalized the “doctrines of maintenance,” which
had prevented uninterested third-party individuals from prosecuting the case
of another; and “champerty,” which was maintenance in expectation of a profit42
that had previously prevented third-party funding arrangements.43 Second,
Parliament enacted the Courts and Legal Services Act (“CLSA”).44 The CLSA
paved the way for litigation funding by legalizing conditional fee agreements.45
Although this legislation made it possible for litigation funding to begin, it was
not until the late 1990s that the UK saw a proliferation of litigation-finance
firms.46
In 1999, litigation funding was not a prevalent practice in the UK. With
the passage of the 1999 Access to Justice Act (“AJA”),47 there was an extensive
increase in funding, as a central purpose of the AJA focused on expanding the
scope of funding arrangements.48 Prior to the AJA, litigation funding was
limited because the practice was confined to conditional fee agreements
between a client and lawyer.49 The AJA sought to change this with three
modifications. First, conditional fee agreements were endorsed between parties
that were not subject to the lawyer-client relationship and consequently became
the sole method for obtaining third-party funding in personal injury cases.50
41. Jason Geisker & Jenny Tallis, Litigation Funding in Australia: A Year of Review and Change?,
CLAIMS FUNDING AUSTRL. (July 24, 2018), https://claimsfundingaus.com.au/news/litigationfunding-australia-year-review-and-change [https://perma.cc/GW7S-PS6E]; Litigation Finance in the
United States: How It Started, YIELDSTREET, https://www.yieldstreet.com/resources/article/litigationfinance-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/AG9X-BFB9].
42. See supra note 22–24 and accompanying text.
43. See Criminal Law Act 1967, c. 58, § 14 (Eng.) (failing to change “any rule of law as to the
cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal”); Whillans,
supra note 31.
44. Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, § 58 (Eng.).
45. See id. (“A conditional fee agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by
virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a conditional fee
agreement.”).
46. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, JOHN PEYSNER & ANGUS NURSE, LITIGATION FUNDING:
STATUS AND ISSUES 18 (2012), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/litigation_funding
_here_1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMR6-3CT8] (detailing how the 1999 AJA led to an increase in
litigation funding by making the practice more accessible to the general public).
47. Access to Justice Act 1999, c. 22, §§ 27–28 (Eng.).
48. Whillans, supra note 31.
49. See id.
50. See id.

98 N.C. L. REV. 973 (2020)

980

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

After the AJA was passed, litigants were no longer permitted to receive civil
legal aid in an attempt to increase the use of fee sharing agreements in personal
injury cases.51 Second, the UK’s “loser pays” policy52 was extended so that
litigants could “pass . . . fees and insurance premiums associated with
[conditional fee agreements] on to their opponents.”53 Finally, the AJA created
a new type of insurance which sought to protect litigants from having to pay
their opponents’ legal fees under the “loser pays” rule in the event that they lost
their case.54 These changes led to a new age in litigation funding.
These remolded fee sharing arrangements, paired with the newly
established “after the event” insurance, created a unique situation.55 Petitioners
were now able to find third-party funders to cover all of their cases and
insurance companies to cover their losses.56 Thus, there was very little risk for
petitioners, and lawyers had the possibility of reaping huge rewards. As if this
was not enough to kickstart the litigation funding revolution, a 2002 opinion
found third-party funding to be lawful and ethical in all situations except for
when the funding was specifically meant to “undermine the ends of justice.”57
Today, litigation funding in the UK has been referred to as a “feature of modern
litigation.”58 The rise in third-party funding created an influx of specific
litigation-finance firms, and these firms have ultimately expanded into the
United States.
3. Progression to the United States
It is difficult to find exact numbers or figures to explain the growth of
litigation finance in the United States because the industry has never been
regulated in a fashion comparable to Australia or the UK.59 However, the
practice has been on the rise since the early 1990s,60 and the first litigation

51. See id.
52. Peter Karsten & Oliver Bateman, Detecting Good Public Policy Rationales for the American Rule:
A Response to the Ill-Conceived Calls for Loser Pays Rules, 66 DUKE L.J. 729, 736 (2016) (establishing that
“the ‘loser pays’ . . . rule may have begun in 1278” and directs defendants to pay costs to successful
plaintiffs (citing Statute of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw., c. 1)).
53. Whillans, supra note 31.
54. HODGES ET AL., supra note 46, at 18.
55. See id. (“[Because of the AJA] in 1999, . . . the full [conditional fee agreement] fee and [afterthe-event insurance] premium [became] recoverable from the defendant.”).
56. See id.
57. See R. (Factortame Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for Transp., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 932 (Eng.).
58. Excalibur Ventures v. Texas Keystone, [2016] EWCA (Civ) 1144 [1] (Eng.).
59. See Ronen Avraham & Anthony Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer
Litigant Funding, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1139–40 (2019).
60. Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and a Proposal To
Bring Litigation Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750, 753–
54 (2012).
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financers were influenced by the success of the practice in those countries.61 In
the early days, lenders led grassroots efforts all over the country, attempting to
find deserving plaintiffs and generate promising returns.62 The first expansion
efforts were often referred to as the “Wild West” period because there were few
rules combined with many people seeking the lucrative cases.63 Perry Walton,
sometimes called the “godfather” of American litigation finance, was one of the
first funders to capitalize on this movement.64 Walton opened a second business
where he loaned plaintiffs money for litigation as “contingent obligations” and
also began leading seminars where he trained hundreds of people on how to find
cases that would generate these returns.65
By the mid-2000s, underhanded lending tactics raised ethical concerns
about the process of funding litigation.66 In 2004, these concerns led to
proactive self-regulation and the creation of the American Legal Finance
Association with the purpose of “promoting fair, ethical, and transparent
funding standards to protect legal funding consumers.”67 These proactive efforts
marked a turn where the industry, through self-regulation, began to make small
compromises or changes in order to stay ahead of legislative reform.68 However,
this self-regulatory framework also prevented the industry from expanding too
quickly.69 Over time, three periods of development have shaped modern
litigation funding.
First, the early days of litigation finance were controlled by individual
investors funding single personal injury claims.70 As the industry evolved, the
cases and stakes grew.71 The more prominent financiers began to focus on “oneoff tort suits” with possible payouts in the millions; as the payouts increased,
institutional investors began to take notice, which ultimately led to the second
large development—commercial litigation funding.72 Commercial litigation

61. See Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 360 (2011).
62. Litigation Finance in the United States: How It Started, supra note 41.
63. See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 55 (2004).
64. Hashway, supra note 60, at 754 (“Walton made his first foray into extortionate lending with
a business he named Wild West Funding.”).
65. See id. (approximating that Walton had trained over 400 people by the year 2000).
66. See id. at 768 (highlighting a court’s concern over the ability of litigation finance companies
to victimize plaintiffs).
67. About ALFA, AM. LEGAL FIN. ASS’N, https://americanlegalfin.com/about-alfa/
[https://perma.cc/7ZJ6-CCR6].
68. See Hashway, supra note 60, at 774.
69. See Litigation Finance in the United States: How It Started, supra note 41.
70. Tara E. Nauful, Third-Party Litigation Financing: Do We Need It? Is It Worth the Risks?, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., May 2016, at 16.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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funding73 was created as a result of the newfound interest in higher payouts.74
By 2000, “large banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and insurance companies”
were all funding litigation.75 This development led to a paradigm shift where
institutional investors turned away from the one-off tort suits and began to
focus on corporate commercial litigation.76 The final shift, which has led to a
massive increase in litigation funding, was the establishment of the
contemporary litigation-finance firms.77 Utilizing portfolio investing, these
firms have been able to raise hundreds of millions of dollars from outside
investors to generate massive returns with very little risk.78
4. Recent Explosion in the United States
What started out as a modest practice has escalated quickly in recent
years.79 Firms raise pools of funding, consisting of hundreds of millions of
dollars, to invest in corporate litigation.80 Between 2013 and 2016, the number
of lawyers who reported having used litigation finance in their practice is said
to have increased by 400%.81 Originally, these firms funded cases in the same
way that Perry Walton backed personal injury cases in the early 1990s.82 Firms
raised money and made payments to corporations and other institutions to be
used for individual cases. However, the practice evolved into its newest form
73. See id. (“In [consumer litigation funding], funders provide corporate plaintiffs with financing
to pursue potentially lucrative—but costly—litigation without a corresponding risk to the company’s
bottom line.”).
74. See id.
75. Litigation Finance in the United States: How It Started, supra note 41; Sara Randazzo, Litigation
Financing Attracts New Set of Investors, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
litigation-financing-attracts-new-set-of-investors-1463348262?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/
BFS4-59SA (dark archive)] [hereinafter Randazzo, Litigation Financing] (“Pension funds, university
endowments, family offices and others have collectively pumped more than a billion dollars into the
sector in recent years.”).
76. See Nauful, supra note 70, at 16 (defining corporate litigation as an amount so significant it
would negatively impact a “company’s bottom line”); Grave & Mould, supra note 7.
77. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1269, 1277 (2011).
78. Sara Randazzo, Investors Flock To Back Lawsuits in Exchange for a Cut of Settlements, WALL ST.
J. (Sep. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-funder-longford-raises-500-million-asindustry-surges-1505707261?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/2W4G-AF5V (dark archive)]
[hereinafter Randazzo, Investors].
79. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75 (detailing how one litigation-finance firm
provided a single law firm over $100 million).
80. See Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party Investors Offer New Funding Source for Major Commercial
Lawsuits, FULBROOK CAP. MGMT., LLC, (Mar. 5, 2010), http://fulbrookmanagement.com/thirdparty-investors-offer-new-funding-source-for-major-commercial-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/LX5D35KN].
81. See Joshua Hunt, What Litigation Finance Is Really About, NEW YORKER (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-litigation-finance-is-really-about
[https://perma.cc/93Q7-ABE6].
82. See Steinitz, supra note 77, at 1277.
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where litigation-finance firms fund portfolios of cases within a specific
institution or law firm.83 The shift from stand-alone investments to portfolio
investments has expanded rapidly. In 2017, a leading litigation-finance firm
invested “$726 [million] into portfolio deals, compared with [its] $72 [million
investment] into stand-alone suits.”84 The newest form of litigation funding
presents even less risk to investors while still maintaining the ability for firms
specializing in litigation finance to secure massive rewards.85
Over the last few years, roughly thirty new litigation-finance firms have
opened their doors in the United States.86 During the same period, these new
firms have raised over $2 billion to fund litigation with the intent of “packaging
lawsuits into portfolios.”87 Because of the recent success, funders are raising
more and more capital so that they can expand portfolios while generating
quicker returns for their investors.88 This strategy offers two immense benefits
for funders. First, it allows firms to mitigate risk because multimillion-dollar
investments are no longer tied to the all-or-nothing investment format.89
Instead, investors provide larger capital contributions to the law firm or
institution to distribute among a variety of cases and, thus, maximize the chance
to recoup their investments.90 Second, because funders are dispersing larger
amounts of money, they are generating returns much more quickly, which has
ultimately allowed them to raise capital at an unprecedented rate.91
Lawyers are leaving top-paying legal jobs and flocking to coveted positions
in litigation finance92 because of the extreme profits and the serious demand for
knowledgeable employees.93 The newest litigation-finance firms are full of
attorneys, many of whom are former partners at some of the most respected law
firms in the country, such as Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Latham &

83. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75 (“Rather than betting on one-off lawsuits,
today’s funders are scaling up and backing large portfolios of cases to deploy money faster and create
more consistent returns for their own investors.”).
84. Appealing Returns: Litigation Finance Offers Investors Attractive Yields, ECONOMIST (Aug. 18,
2018),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/08/18/litigation-finance-offersinvestors-attractive-yields [https://perma.cc/5A2T-ZLSU].
85. Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78.
86. Appealing Returns: Litigation Finance Offers Investors Attractive Yields, supra note 84.
87. See id.; Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78.
88. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75.
89. Christopher P. Bogart, The Case for Litigation Financing, LITIG., Spring 2016, at 46, 48.
90. See id.
91. See Thomas J. Salerno & Jordan A. Kroop, Third-Party Litigation Funding: Where Do We Go
Now?, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2018, at 3.
92. Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33.
93. See id. The average expected return for every dollar invested is roughly $2.70 within thirty
months. Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75. Likewise, in 2017, the largest litigation-finance
firm in the industry experienced a 170% increase to their six-month profits. Randazzo, Investors, supra
note 78 (finding also that Buford Capital earned $142.7 million in profit during the first half of 2017).
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Watkins LLP; and Proskauer Rose LLP.94 Looking at the websites of the top
litigation-finance firms, it is often difficult to determine whether one is looking
at a law firm or an investment firm because so many employees are advertised
in their respected legal capacities.95 These finance firms have been so successful
at raising capital that they have had to turn away potential investors.96 The new
influx in capital is giving firms the freedom to adapt and develop new, creative
investment strategies within the industry.97 While some firms have used the
newly acquired funds to expand their investment strategies through the
development of boutique firms and the acquisition of new lawyers-turnedinvestors, others have employed more unique methods, such as using a potential
litigation proceeding to leverage an acquisition.98 Because of the recent growth
in the industry, litigation-finance firms now have a freedom and opportunity to
manipulate American litigation that they did not have in the past.99
II. HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL FEE-SHARING PROHIBITIONS
The origin of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) implementing rules
to protect against fee sharing can be traced back to the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics.100 However, the basis for Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 3-102(A) dates back
to the common law doctrines of barratry, maintenance, and champerty that were
created in the Middle Ages to protect clients against interference from third
parties who had a superior knowledge of the legal system.101 Although some
scholars argue the original purposes of these doctrines may be antiquated,102 the

94. Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33.
95. See, e.g., Meet the IMF Bentham Team, United States, IMF BENTHAM,
https://www.imf.com.au/about/meet-the-team [https://perma.cc/Y8R7-E2QZ] (listing “legal counsel”
as an employee title for all United States employees but one); Search the Team, United States, BURFORD
CAP.,
http://www.burfordcapital.com/directory/?location=1
[https://perma.cc/S3AV-VVJM]
(advertising employees’ former legal titles and positions on the biographies home page).
96. See Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78 (“Longford [Capital Management LP] said it attracted
enough interest from investors to raise $1 billion for the recently closed fund, . . . but decided to cap it
at half that.”).
97. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. While Disciplinary Rule 3-102(A) is the ABA’s first specific rule prohibiting fee sharing, the
“undivided fidelity” required by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics is thought to be the first barrier
to such arrangements. See infra text accompanying note 104; see also Edward S. Adams & John H.
Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1998) (suggesting that, although the original Canons of Professional Ethics did not specifically
account for “whether practicing lawyers could enter into business associations with nonlawyers,” the
foundation for future developments was laid in 1908).
101. See Lyon, supra note 23, at 580.
102. Cf. id. at 579–80 (“[T]he evolution of the doctrines from the common law to the modern day
. . . shows that they are out of step with our contemporary beliefs about litigation.”).
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guiding principles maintain their roots in the present-day rule against fee
sharing with nonlawyers.103
As fee-sharing arrangements have progressed over the last century,
lawyers have consistently been required to pledge fidelity to their clients by
avoiding any “matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect
to which confidence has been reposed.”104 The original Canon of Professional
Ethics advised lawyers to avoid all undue influence from third parties and to
remain impartially dedicated to their clients’ interests. With the adoption of
Canon 34 two decades later, the ABA specifically prohibited fee sharing
between a lawyer and a nonlawyer for the first time105 and thereby solidified the
previous beliefs that such fee sharing would constitute an adverse client
interest.106 In 1969, the ABA modified Canon 34 by adopting the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and codifying DR 3-102(A).107 Today, the rule against
fee sharing generally protects against three undesirable behaviors: “(1)
interfering with a lawyer’s professional judgment in handling of a legal matter,
(2) using dishonest or illegal methods . . . in order to win cases[,] . . . or (3)
encouraging or pressuring a lawyer to use such improper methods.”108 The
implicit influence associated with the first behavior seems to have been the most
prevalent concern when the ABA created rules prohibiting fee-sharing
arrangements; however, the explicit influence underlying the second and third
behaviors has gained more attention in recent years.
A.

The Modern Standard for Prohibiting Fee Sharing

When lawyers represent clients, they are bound by a fiduciary duty “of the
highest degree;”109 therefore, lawyers must exercise their professional judgment
solely on behalf of their clients.110 Today, the profession assumes fee sharing
with a nonlawyer splits a lawyer’s interests and interferes with a lawyer’s
professional judgment with regard to his or her clients.111 More specifically,
103. See 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty, Maintenance, and Barratry § 1, Westlaw (database updated
Nov. 2019) (citing Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1110–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
104. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
105. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1928).
106. See Roy D. Simon, Jr., Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 YALE L.J.
1069, 1079–80 (1989) (“[N]o division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service or responsibility.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1928))).
107. See id. at 1082.
108. SIMON & HYLAND, supra note 5, at 1420.
109. See Lisa Miller, Perils of Third-Party Funding, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2017, at 19.
110. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates 4
(Feb. 2012) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011))
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_al
f_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV8S-PK6P (staff-uploaded
archive].
111. See id. at 29.
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when bar associations attempt to protect against fee sharing, they seem to enact
such policies under the belief that when a lawyer engages in fee sharing, he or
she—either directly or indirectly—sacrifices some degree of judgment to ensure
that his or her funders will recoup their investment.112 The current rules in the
Rules of Professional Conduct pertaining to fee sharing are designed to protect a
number of client interests,113 and a fee-sharing arrangement that results in a
lawyer surrendering any portion of their earnings to a third party could
potentially jeopardize those interests.
Legal scholars have expanded on these concerns by highlighting situations
where fee sharing with nonlawyers will do more harm than simply requiring a
lawyer to sacrifice some level of judgment.114 In these situations, the fear is that
these relationships with a third party incentivize lawyers to act dishonestly or
even illegally. The concern over this more explicit manipulation is not
unfounded. In Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp.,115 the Supreme
Court of Ohio found that this type of manipulation had occurred when it held
that a settlement offer presented to the client was beneficial to the client’s
lawyer and financier but was detrimental to the client.116 A lawyer should not
be influenced by a third party’s desire to impact a case because of “political,
ideological, or personal beliefs.”117 In theory, fee sharing is supposed to create
disinterested investors; in practice, the arrangements create extraneous
relationships between lawyers and financiers that can supersede the
relationships between clients and attorneys.118
All fifty states have adopted or expanded the ABA’s DR 3-10(A) to
provide a rule of conduct similar to New York’s Rule 5.4(a) stating that “[a]
lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer.”119 While state
bar associations have issued countless informal opinions commenting on the
scope of impermissible fee sharing, ethics committees from only a few state bar
associations have concentrated specifically on litigation funding.120 States
112. See id. at 22 (suggesting that the funder’s goal of maximizing their investment cannot be
entirely isolated from the litigation proceeding).
113. See id. at 15 (stating that the rules are designed to protect a client’s “confidentiality of
information . . . , the reasonable expectation of loyalty of counsel, and the interest in receiving candid,
unbiased advice”).
114. See, e.g., Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388, 401–
02 (2016) (indicating that undisclosed funding opens the door for “disastrous” manipulation).
115. 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
116. Id. at 220.
117. W. Bradley Wendel, Paying the Piper but Not Calling the Tune: Litigation Financing and
Professional Independence, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1, 4 (2018).
118. See id.
119. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019) (“Professional Independence of a
Lawyer”). This Comment specifically highlights New York’s rule of conduct because of its importance
in Formal Opinion 2018-5 issued by the NYCBA.
120. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 110, at 24–25.

98 N.C. L. REV. 973 (2020)

2020]

A GREAT & PROFITABLE CLAUSE

987

disagree as to what constitutes impermissible fee sharing with regard to
litigation funding under a contingent interest.121 Some states consider it to be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a litigation funder to take a
contingent interest in a case where the lawyer has a contingent fee agreement
with the client.122 However, other states have been more lenient on this
position.123 The NYCBA appears to be one of the first bar associations to focus
on the magnitude of fee sharing stemming from modern litigation funding. Its
recent opinion is an attempt to specifically interpret how the practice should be
governed under the Rules of Professional Conduct.124
B.

The Progression of the Rule Against Fee Sharing in New York

The New York State Bar Association has actively attempted to define the
scope of impermissible fee-sharing arrangements under its rules. To date, the
state bar association has deemed numerous activities impermissible under the
prohibition against fee sharing. Such activities include client recruitment and
the solicitation of services,125 determining marketing fees based on fees
generated from individual clients,126 and crowdfunding or other fundraising
activities.127 Furthermore, the NYCBA has expanded on the tenets underlying
these bans by further prohibiting fee-sharing arrangements with nonlawyers
who provide administrative services128 and for arrangements with a landlord for
rental payments.129 The New York State Bar Association has made it clear that
arrangements of these types are only impermissible when they are arranged
under certain contingencies related to specific clients.130 For example, New York
allows lawyers to pay for particular services.131 However, under Rule 5.4(a), a
lawyer must consider two issues in order to ensure compensation agreements
121. See id. at 29.
122. See e.g., Va. State Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1764 (2002).
123. See Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. KBA E-432, at 7 (2011).
124. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018).
125. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 917, ¶ 4 (2012) (“[T]he law firm [can]
not pay a bonus to an employee-marketer that is based on the referral or recommendation of specific
clients.”).
126. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 992, ¶ 16 (2013) (“Payment of a percentage
of firm profits for a specific matter is tantamount to fee sharing and is not permitted.”).
127. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1062, ¶ 17 (2015) (“Any form of
fundraising that gives the investor an interest in a law firm or a share of its revenue would be
prohibited.”).
128. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2015-1, at 6 (2015) (“[A]ny payment
arrangement with a [professional employer organization] must be structured so it complies with the
rule against fee-sharing.”)
129. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018) (“[A] lawyer may not
agree to pay [a] landlord [with a] percentage of [the] firm’s revenues as office rent.” (citing N.Y.
County Lawyers Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 697 (1993))).
130. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 992, ¶ 16.
131. See id. ¶ 10 (“[T]he lawyer may enter into an agreement to compensate the business owner
for marketing or other services.”).
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are permissible. First, nonlawyers may not be paid a “commission or percentage
based upon the volume of business developed.”132 Second, a nonlawyer may only
receive a percentage of a lawyer or law firm’s overall profits.133 Thus, it is
considered impermissible fee sharing for a lawyer and nonlawyer to enter a
compensation agreement based on fees earned from a specific client associated
with the service provided by the nonlawyer.134 In its recent opinion on the
subject, the NYCBA decided that funding a case on a contingent interest is
essentially taking a percentage of an all-or-nothing stake in a client and should
be considered impermissible.135 Thus, the litigation-finance practices employed
by firms operating under the contemporary contingency standards should likely
be considered impermissible under Rule 5.4(a).
III. WHY NON-RECOURSE INVESTMENT POOLING IS IMPERMISSIBLE
Not all fee-sharing arrangements between a lawyer and nonlawyer are
impermissible.136 Instead, issues arise when fee-sharing arrangements are
structured in a way that the funder receives a contingent interest in the stakes
of the litigation because there is no way to ensure that lawyers will remain loyal
to their clients.137 According to the NYCBA in Formal Opinion 2018-5, the New
York Rule of Professional Conduct prohibiting a lawyer (or law firm) from
sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer138 “is equally applicable when the lawyer’s
payment to the funder is based on the recovery of legal fees in multiple matters
. . . as opposed to a single matter.”139 The NYCBA’s underlying theory is based
on the central prohibition against fee sharing. When funders provide financing
to a lawyer for more than one matter, the funder still retains the incentive to
improperly influence and might even retain the ability to manipulate. In
Opinion 2018-5, the NYCBA acknowledged that its interpretation of Rule
5.4(a) could be considered overly expansive;140 however, it unequivocally
determined that “[n]othing in the language, history or prior interpretations of
Rule 5.4(a) supports an interpretation carving out litigation funding
arrangements.”141
132. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 565, ¶ 9 (1984).
133. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 887, ¶ 11 (2011).
134. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 992, ¶ 14.
135. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018) (“A nonrecourse
financing agreement secured by legal fees in a matter . . . constitutes an impermissible fee-sharing
arrangement regardless of how the lawyer’s payments are calculated.”).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 25–30.
137. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 5–6 (“[W]hen
nonlawyers have a stake in legal fees from particular matters, they have an incentive or ability to
improperly influence the lawyer.”).
138. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2017).
139. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 5.
140. See id. at 6.
141. See id.
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Opinion 2018-5 is important because it sheds light on how a rapidly
growing component of the modern legal culture might actually be unethical and
ultimately impermissible. Today, there are a few reasons to be concerned with
the ability of litigation funders to exert improper influence on the cases they
finance. One of the biggest concerns is that the modern system of litigation
finance is dominated by former lawyers with a working knowledge of how to
control the financed cases. The current litigation funding system is structured
such that, technically, nonlawyers lend money to lawyers. However, because of
funders’ previous experience in the legal field, the modern application of the
rule might be more effective if the rule actually protected against outside
lawyers lending to other lawyers.
A.

Influences Elicited by the Modern Investor

Ethical standards and expertise are foundational barriers to becoming a
lawyer. As American lawyer and legal scholar John Wigmore wrote, “The Law
as a pursuit is not a trade. It is a profession. It ought to signify for its followers
a mental and moral setting apart from the multitude,—a priesthood of
Justice.”142 For decades, being a lawyer has been a revered career characterized
by certain occupational expertise and status. Because of this, lawyers—or
“litigation engineers”143—are expected to provide a specialized service unique
to any other individual.144 When examining the potential variables and
outcomes of a case, lawyers are “best able to assess [the] merits and probable
outcome[s].”145 Thus, the current wave of litigation-finance firms, comprised of
former lawyers with decades of experience, would appear to have an inherent
advantage when investigating which cases to fund because these lawyers have
insight into the effect that their investments might ultimately have on the
funded litigation.146
Although employees of these firms understand that they are not practicing
law, there is no doubt that a thorough knowledge of the legal profession is seen
as a decisive factor for being successful within the industry.147 The current
landscape of litigation funding allows investors to use their unparalleled,
142. John H. Wigmore, Introduction to ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
at xxi (1915).
143. See Radek Goral, Justice Dealers: The Ecosystem of American Litigation Finance, 21 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 98, 119 (2015).
144. See id. (“[Lawyers] put the facts together, evaluate them, and build a case for the represented
client.”).
145. Id.
146. See Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33; see also infra note 150–54 and
accompanying text.
147. See Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33 (“I understand I’m not going to be
practicing law, but there’s nothing to stop me from being able to share my knowledge to help achieve
a great result in these cases.”).
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practical knowledge of the legal industry and apply their knowledge to an
investment setting through the litigation proceedings of a third party.148 The
results of the cases backed by modern funders are illustrative of the fact that
former-lawyers-turned-investors are well versed in picking which cases will
yield successful outcomes for their firms. For example, over the last decade,
Longford Capital, a leading private investment company, has invested nearly
$150 million into 102 separate lawsuits; of these cases, forty-three settled or
were resolved without having to go to court, thus generating quick and efficient
returns for the firm.149 While these figures do not support the causal inference
that financiers are forcing settlements, the continued growth of litigation
finance and the more than 40% settlement rate in the preceding example, taken
together, indicate a strong correlation between third-party funders and a
propensity towards settlement.
Presently, these nonpracticing attorneys spend their days combing
through court records and soliciting legal contacts from their prior
professions.150 However, because investors have very specific criteria for
choosing cases, they select only a small number of cases to finance.151 Certain
firms have even been able to code these specifications into algorithms that flag
potential cases based on profitability factors, such as a specific law firm or the
type of claim being filed.152 In a sense, these investors are using their expertise
as lawyers to continuously search for cases that, if funded, will ultimately
generate a favorable return from a settlement, judgment, or fee award.153
Investors are acutely aware that third-party funding can impact litigation by
actually “mak[ing] it harder and more expensive to settle cases.”154 Thus, when
a third party finances a case, the actual act of funding the proceeding can have
a determinative outcome on the result of the case—such as whether or not it
will settle. This is ultimately a form of manipulation or, at the very least, some
level of influence.
Again, the purpose of the rule against fee sharing is to protect against “(1)
interfering with a lawyer’s professional judgment in handling of a legal matter,
148. See Why Big Law Litigators Are Making the Move to the Litigation Finance Industry, BENTHAM
IMF (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/2017/
09/06/why-big-law-litigators-are-making-the-move-to-the-litigation-finance-industry
[https://perma.cc/2Y5G-N2LM].
149. See Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78.
150. See Randazzo, The New Hot Job, supra note 33.
151. See Lindeman, supra note 80 (detailing the process and selectivity of choosing which cases to
fund).
152. Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78 (suggesting that “creditworthiness of [a] defendant” is
another factor that an algorithm might flag).
153. See Jacob Gershman, Lawsuit Funding, Long Hidden in the Shadows, Faces Calls for More Sunlight,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2018 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-funding-long-hidden-inthe-shadows-faces-calls-for-more-sunlight-1521633600 [https://perma.cc/S93P-YC9V (dark archive)].
154. See id. (quoting the chief investment officer of IMF Bentham’s U.S. division).
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(2) using dishonest or illegal methods . . . in order to win cases . . . or (3)
encouraging or pressuring a lawyer to use such improper methods.”155 It could
easily be considered a dishonest or encouraging method to provide financing
for a litigation proceeding with the understanding that the funds will elicit a
certain outcome. This becomes even clearer when investors operate under the
appearance of being uninvolved third-party investors but have the knowledge
to understand and anticipate that their contributions will likely have a
significant and profitable impact.
B.

Recent Attempts at Reformation

The idea that litigation funders are able to manipulate the American
litigation system through third-party financing is not new. In 2017, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce petitioned to change the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure regarding the disclosure of third-party financing arrangements.156
The organization made the same requests in both 2014 and 2016 but was
denied.157 The latest request was based on the idea that disclosure of the source
of funding is necessary to ensure impartiality in light of the industry’s
exponential growth in recent years.158 In its letter to the U.S. Courts’
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Committee, the Chamber urged
for change on the basis that third-party litigation is currently able to skirt the
ethical boundaries of the law due to a lack of regulators and disclosure
regulations.159 Its request argued that the current system creates an inherent
conflict of interest by concealing the “real party . . . interest[s] that may be
steering a plaintiff’s litigation strategy and settlement decisions.”160

155. SIMON & HYLAND, supra note 5, at 1420.
156. Alison Frankel, Business Lobby Calls for Federal Rules To Require Litigation Funding Disclosure,
REUTERS (June 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-funding/business-lobby-calls-forfederal-rules-to-require-litigation-funding-disclosure-idUSKBN18T2QR
[https://perma.cc/5SEQVHLA]. The petition seeks to change Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by requiring
disclosure of “any agreement under which any person, other than an attorney permitted to charge a
contingent fee representing a party, has a right to receive compensation that is contingent on, and
sourced from, any proceeds of the civil action, by settlement, judgment or otherwise.” Garrett
Ordower, Update: Rules Governing Disclosure of Litigation Finance, ABOVE L. (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/02/update-rules-governing-disclosure-of-litigation-finance/?rf=1
[https://perma.cc/YGS2-LR65].
157. See Ordower, supra note 156.
158. See Frankel, supra note 156. (“The business groups contend that the increased prevalence,
profitability and diversification of outside funding arrangements prove the need for a rule change to
require robust disclosure.”).
159. Letter from Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Rebecca A.
Womeldorf, Sec’y of the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts (June 1, 2017), http://filehost.thompsonhine.com/uploads/Proposal-to-Amend-Rule-26-forThird-Party-Litigation-Funding-Disclosure_53eb.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KWM-8XPU].
160. See id.
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The Chamber is not the only institution attempting to initiate change to
the regulation of litigation finance. In February of 2019, U.S. Senators Chuck
Grassley (Iowa), John Cornyn (Texas), Ben Sasse (Nebraska), and Thom Tillis
(North Carolina) reintroduced a bill which would require disclosure of thirdparty litigation financing.161 The Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2019
would require disclosure of “the identity of any commercial enterprise, other
than a class member or class counsel of record, that has a right to receive
payment that is contingent on the receipt of monetary relief . . . by settlement,
judgment, or otherwise.”162 Senator Grassley’s proposal would require only the
disclosure of third-party funding for class action and multidistrict litigation.163
Both proposals seem to advance the notion that increased transparency would
allow clients to see who is pulling the strings behind the curtain and ultimately
avoid any possible influence from a party operating outside of the actual
proceeding. Although the proposed bill’s reform efforts do not encompass the
full scope sought by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the underlying reasons
for Senator Grassley’s suggested reformation parallel those driving the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce in its efforts for litigation-finance reform.164
Senator Grassley and the Chamber emphasize another reason in their
requests for the disclosure of third-party funding arrangements: the total lack
of regulation of the industry.165 It is indisputable that litigation-financing
arrangements constitute some form of an investment product. Funders supply
capital to lawyers with an expectation of taking a portion of the profits and
generating large returns.166 Yet, these arrangements are not regulated the same
as comparably structured investments.167 At a minimum, modern funding
arrangements should be subject to some form of financial regulation.
C.

An Overlooked Method of Regulation

Classifying third-party funding as a security is one potential mechanism
for regulatory oversight. The Securities Act of 1933 defines what constitutes a
security168: “any note, stock, treasury stock, . . . or participation in any profit161. Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2019, S. 471, 116th Cong. (2019).
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See Grassley, Tillis, Cornyn Introduce Bill To Shine Light on Third Party Litigation Financing
Agreements, CHUCK GRASSLEY (May 10, 2018), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/newsreleases/grassley-tillis-cornyn-introduce-bill-shine-light-third-party-litigation
[https://perma.cc/6SXC-P9XB] (“[L]itigation funding agreements have secretly funneled money into
our civil justice system, all for the purpose of profiting off someone else’s case.”).
165. Compare id. (“Third party litigation funding . . . is largely unregulated and subject to little
oversight.”), with Letter from Lisa A. Rickard to Rebecca A. Womeldorf, supra note 159 (“Absent
robust disclosure requirements, TPLF will continue to operate in the shadows.”).
166. See Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78.
167. See infra Section III.C.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018).
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sharing agreement . . . .”169 Although there has been some disagreement as to
whether litigation funding should be classified as a loan or equity
arrangement,170 the language of the Act should presumably apply to either
classification. Because these new-age funding arrangements constitute some
type of profit sharing, the statutory provision appears to apply to any practical
interpretation of litigation finance.
To date, there has been little to no consensus as to whether litigation
funding should constitute a security under the Act. However, when comparing
the statutory construction of profit sharing to other terms from the Act, there
is a clear argument that these agreements should be presumed to be securities
unless proven otherwise. In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,171 the Supreme
Court held that “the plain meaning of the statutory definition mandates that
the stock be treated as ‘securities’ subject to the coverage of the Acts.”172 Under
its interpretation in Landreth, the Court ruled that investment instruments,
which are explicitly stated in the definition of a security and conform with the
usual characteristics of the instrument, are the “clearest case for coverage by the
plain language of the definition.”173
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court expanded on this idea in Reves v.
Ernst & Young.174 In Reves, the Supreme Court determined that “because the
Securities Acts define ‘security’ to include ‘any note,’ we begin with a
presumption that every note is a security.”175 The Court established that this
presumption is rebuttable only by using the four “family resemblance” factors176
to compare the note against a carefully enumerated list of notes that do not
constitute securities.177 The first factor looks to the buyer and seller’s
motivations underlying the transaction; the second factor examines the plan of
distribution for the note; the third factor analyzes the reasonable expectations
of the public investing in the note; while the fourth factor considers whether
there is an alternative regulatory structure in place to govern the note if it is not
considered a security.178 In other words, since the statutory language provides
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See infra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
171. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
172. Id. at 687.
173. See id. at 693.
174. 494 U.S. 56, 62–63 (1990).
175. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
176. See id. at 66–67.
177. See id. at 65 (establishing the list of nonsecurity notes, including “the note delivered in
consumer financing, . . . the note secured by a mortgage on a home, . . . the short-term note secured
by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, . . . the note evidencing a ‘character’ loan to a bank
customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply
formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business” (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank
of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976))).
178. Id. at 66–67.
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for “any note,” the Court reasoned that all notes should be considered securities
except for a very small carve out of investment instruments. These investment
instruments technically may be called notes, but—when analyzed under the
family resemblance factors—they are actually more analogous to notes that have
been expressly excluded from being classified as securities as they are notes only
in title.179 Because the Act explicitly provides the same statutory language for
“any profit-sharing agreement,”180—until proven otherwise—the presumption
established in Reves should seemingly be extended to all profit-sharing
arrangements unless the arrangement is sufficiently shown to be a profit-sharing
agreement in title only.
Although modern litigation funding inherently involves some level of
profit sharing, the dispute between investors and judiciaries181 over the most
applicable investment structure opens the door for the possibility of
circumventing the profit-sharing presumption. If, and only if, litigation
financiers are able to sufficiently convince the judiciary that their modern
funding arrangements are able to overcome this significant presumption, they
likely face yet another hurdle in regard to securities regulation.182 Under the
Securities Act of 1933, “investment contract[s]” are also considered securities.183
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,184 the Supreme Court defined an investment contract
as any “transaction . . . whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party.”185 With this definition, the Court ultimately created another
four-element test used to classify investment products as securities.186 Since the
inception of this definition, investment contracts have served as the catchall for
establishing securities by allowing for the inclusion of unique investment
opportunities not explicitly stated in the definition of a “security” under the
Act.187
Of the four investment contract elements defined in Howey, litigation
finance arrangements appear to clearly satisfy two of the elements, but the other
179. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text.
180. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
181. See infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
182. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (finding that if an investment structure qualifies as a note within
the statutory language, it would be superfluous and inconsistent with Congress’ intent to require that
it also satisfy the test for an investment contract).
183. § 77b(a)(1).
184. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
185. Id. at 298–99.
186. Id. at 301 (defining the four elements as: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with an expectation of profits, (4) solely from the efforts of others).
187. Over time, the statutory interpretation of an investment contract has been construed broadly,
as “oil and gas drilling programs,” “farm lands,” and even “whiskey warehouse receipts” have all been
found to be investment contracts subject to securities regulation. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (9th ed. 2016).
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two are less definitive. Because a funder contributing money to a lawyer has
clearly invested money with an expectation of profits, whether third-party
litigation financing should be considered an investment contract depends on if
such arrangements form a common enterprise and if the funder’s expectation of
earning profits is based solely on the efforts of others. Currently, there is a
circuit split as to whether horizontal commonality188 or vertical commonality189
is the sufficient standard for establishing a common enterprise.190
However, in determining whether litigation funding arrangements should
be considered investment contracts, more attention should be placed on the
“efforts of others” element. Determining whether the expectation of profits is
dependent solely on the efforts of others requires examining the transaction
realistically but not literally.191 The predominant test is “whether the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise.”192 When applying this test to litigation finance arrangements,
nonlawyer funders are placed in a no-win situation. On the one hand, funders
can argue the success of the investment is based solely on the effort of the lawyer
or law firm. Under this argument, the financing arrangements would move
closer to requiring regulation as a security. On the other hand, funders could
argue their efforts help to dictate the outcome of the investment agreement
because their capital contributions provide necessary financial resources for the
proceedings. However, if funders attempt to make this argument, they would
be openly acknowledging their expectation to control a litigation proceeding as
a third party, thus exerting the exact influences prohibited by Rule 5.4(a) of the
Professional Rules of Conduct.
IV. ADDRESSING CRITICISM BY FUNDERS TO THE NEW YORK CITY BAR
ASSOCIATION
There have been many critics of the NYCBA’s recent condemnation of
third-party funding through portfolio investments. Quite literally, investors
have hundreds of millions of dollars invested in the practice, so it makes sense
that they would react negatively to an advisory opinion opposing their
188. See James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 59, 61 (2011) (defining “horizontal commonality”). To establish commonality under the horizontal
standard, investors are required to participate in the “sharing or pooling of funds.” Hirk v. AgriResearch Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977).
189. In contrast, vertical commonality can be established so long as there is commonality between
the investor and promoter regardless of whether there are multiple investors. Hector v. Wiens, 533
F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976).
190. See generally Brodt v. Bache, 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing the differences between
different circuits’ interpretations to the commonality requirement).
191. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
192. Id.
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interests.193 The root of these objections stems from the belief that a lawyer who
engages in receiving funds through this new-age financing does not sacrifice
any more freedom than a lawyer who borrows funds using a traditional recourse
loan.194 Because the rule against fee sharing between a lawyer and nonlawyer
predates the practice of commercial litigation funding, modern investors feel
that the prohibition is antiquated and baseless.195 While it is completely possible
to debate the merits of the NYCBA’s advisory opinion on certain grounds,196
many of the self-interested responses from these investors fail to account for
the modern progression of commercial litigation funding.
A.

How Funders Have Improperly Characterized Financing Agreements

Investors primarily object to the recent ethics opinion’s sharp contrast
between the permissibility of recourse-funding arrangements and the
impermissibility of non-recourse lending.197 The basis for this disagreement
comes from the longstanding belief that funders consider present-day litigation
funding to be a purchase of equity in the result of litigation rather than a loan.198
To these funders, traditional recourse loans are seen to exert a greater influence
on lawyers and litigation because of the high-interest rates accompanying these
transactions. For instance, in Hamilton Capital VII, LLC, I v. Khorrami, LLP,199
a law firm entered into a traditional recourse loan where it received $6 million
secured by the firm’s property.200 Within five years and after defaulting on the
loan, the firm had accrued an additional $2 million in interest fees.201 The
funders opposing Opinion 2018-5 by the NYCBA have claimed “[it] is difficult
to understand how . . . a high-interest loan . . . would have less impact on that

193. In 2016, four prominent funding firms had collectively invested well over $1 billion in U.S.
and international litigation. Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75.
194. See Anthony E. Davis & Anthony J. Sebok, New Ethics Opinion on Litigation Funding Gets It
Wrong, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/08/31/new-ethicsopinion-on-litigation-funding-gets-it-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/2MLZ-YZA8].
195. See Allison Chock, Sarah Jacobson & Connor Williams, Curiouser and Curiouser! A Review of
the NYCBA’s Ethics Opinion on Litigation Funding, BENTHAM IMF (Sep. 11, 2018),
https://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/2018/09/11/curiouser-andcuriouser!-a-review-of-the-nycba-s-ethics-opinion-on-litigation-funding
[https://perma.cc/LD68VC9A].
196. Increasingly, case law that supports the opinion “that judges do not believe that contingent
financing through fees is a violation of Rule 5.4(a).” See Davis & Sebok, supra note 194.
197. Chock et al., supra note 195 (“The NYCBA’s efforts to distinguish non-recourse arrangements
for this treatment only highlight the arbitrary nature of its ruling.”).
198. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2, at 3 n.7 (“We provide funds
by purchasing a small portion of the anticipated proceeds. It is not a loan, so there is no interest, no
matter how long it takes for the case to be resolved.”).
199. No. 650791/2015, 2015 WL 4920281 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 17, 2015).
200. See id.
201. See id.
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law firm’s independence on that matter than a non-recourse loan, which limits
the lender’s recovery to assets only where the firm is successful.”202
While this argument may have been appropriate in the early days of
commercial litigation funding, these critics seemingly fail to account for the size
and expansion of the industry in today’s society. Third-party funding may be
structured as an equity investment if the investments are limited; however, the
modern practice operates on the expectation of returns as if the funds are
advanced as a loan. In Echeverria v. Estate of Linder,203 Judge Warshawsky—in
reference to the inherent nature of third-party funding—said:
[I]t is ludicrous to consider this transaction anything else but a loan
unless the court was to consider it legalized gambling. Is it a gamble to
loan/invest money to a plaintiff in a Labor Law action where there is
strict liability? I think not. In fact, it might be considered a “sure
thing.”204
This idea is indicative of what the practice has evolved into today. Rather than
funding one-off cases with the hopes of receiving a profit, litigation-finance
firms are staffing up with top lawyers who are tasked with using their experience
and knowledge to filter through cases to find the “sure thing.”205
In fact, when these former-lawyers-turned-investors succeed in their
attempts to find the type of diamond-in-the-rough case, they can transform
their efforts into a science of sorts. As previously mentioned, litigation-finance
firms now implement algorithms based on the prior results of their funding
ventures to scan thousands of court documents and compute the cases where
they can solicit lawyers for the opportunity to invest with a high probability of
success.206 The modern portfolio investment structure also ensures litigation
finance firms find the “sure thing.” Although every case financed may not yield
a favorable return, funding numerous cases within a single firm significantly
decreases the risk associated with lending and makes the investment structure
more analogous to a loan.
B.

The Inherent Influences in Modern Funding Arrangements

Even if litigation finance is more analogous to a permissible recourse loan
under Rule 5.4(a), the inherent influence exerted by third-party funders is still
problematic for two reasons. First, the influx of capital provided to these cases
is a form of manipulation in itself because the cases are selected with a
202. Chock et al., supra note 195.
203. No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005), judgment entered sub nom.
Echeverria v. Lindner, No. 018666/02, 2005 WL 6050781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 2005).
204. Id. at *8.
205. See Lindeman, supra note 80 (reporting that one firm’s average case screening process is so
detailed it takes sixty to ninety days and costs $75,000–$100,000 per screening).
206. See supra text accompanying note 152.
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presumption of how the financing will dictate a favorable outcome for the firm.
In other words, the funders’ superior knowledge of the legal system allows firms
to purchase a theorized degree of control over the outcomes of their
investments, as evidenced by one prominent litigation finance firm obtaining
settlements in over 40% of the cases its portfolio financed207 and another firm
readily acknowledging the barriers third-party funding places on a litigation
proceeding.208
The second form of influence is based on the continuing relationships
formed between lawyers and funders under the current system. For all intents
and purposes, third-party funding is a good deal for the funder and the lawyers
receiving the capital. Funders are generating large returns with a high
probability of success, and the lawyers or law firms are able to operate without
the risk of loss. The current portfolio-funding system, where third-party
financers provide funds to be used across multiple cases, is based on continued
success between these two parties. As lawyers perform, they are rewarded with
more and more capital to use in their pursuits of more litigation.209 These
continuous funding arrangements, backed by unprecedented amounts money,
indisputably create a loyalty between funder and lawyer, because the lawyer
would like to continue operating risk free. As these relationships grow, the
likelihood that lawyers will act in a manner inconsistent with their client’s best
interest becomes greater and greater. Both forms of influence provide funders
with the opportunity to control or manipulate the outcome of cases, the exact
type of behavior that the rules prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and
nonlawyers are intended to prevent.
CONCLUSION
Third-party funding is not a new practice but, in fact, has been around for
centuries. The NYCBA has not condemned the practice of lawyers receiving
money from third parties to finance their cases. Rather, its recent ethics opinion
is centered around very specific commercial litigation-funding arrangements.
The opinion found that when funders and lawyers enter into contingent feesharing agreements, where a funder’s recovery is to be determined on the
outcome of a single case or multiple cases, the funder has an inherent incentive
or ability to exert influence over the lawyer to the detriment of the lawyer’s
client.
The parties who seem to be the most condemning of the NYCBA’s recent
ethics opinion are those who are heavily invested in the practice of litigation
207. See supra text accompanying note 149.
208. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
209. See generally Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75 (finding that last year, one thirdparty funding firm “provided $100 million to an unnamed global law firm”).
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financing. They argue that third-party financing is a wholly ethical practice that
has become a staple of American litigation because it provides greater freedom
and access to litigation for all. In addition to the belief that litigation funding
should be permissible within the scope of Rule 5.4(a), the proponents of
litigation funding also argue that third-party funding is neither a loan subject
to usury regulations nor a profit-sharing or investment contract subject to
securities regulation. Under the contemporary system of litigation financing,
the pseudo lawyer/investment analyst is able to manipulate this lack of
regulatory interference to generate large profits at a high probability. In a sense,
the modern-day funder uses previous knowledge, experience, and relationships
to improperly interfere with litigation in the United States legal system.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the NYCBA, it is indisputable that
litigation finance has evolved into a new, “mainstream”210 form and is rapidly
having a larger and larger effect on the American legal system. Because of the
industry’s origins and self-governing progression, third-party funders have
generated massive returns without encountering much regulatory oversight. As
the investing practice continues to experience rapid growth, it is possible that
an agency such as the SEC will take over regulation; however, the rule
prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers has been one of the
only checks on the industry—and in some cases has gone largely ignored. The
NYCBA openly admitted that its advisory opinion might have surpassed the
scope of the original rule prohibiting fee sharing; however, it also recognized
the deceptive and deceitful dangers underlying contingent funding
arrangements. In light of the modern reform efforts to control third-party
funding, it is entirely possible that the bar association was attempting to use its
only available means to limit the extreme profits resulting from this misleading
practice.
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